GBAS Fundamentals

Fundamentals
Title	GBAS Fundamentals
Author(s)	GMV
Level	Basic
Year of Publication	2011

A Ground-Based Augmentation System (GBAS) is a civil-aviation safety-critical system that supports local augmentation – at airport level – of the primary GNSS constellation(s) by providing enhanced levels of service that support all phases of approach, landing, departure and surface operations. While the main goal of GBAS is to provide integrity assurance, it also increases the accuracy with position errors below 1 m (1 sigma).

The Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) is intended primarily to support precision approach operations. It consists of a GBAS Ground Subsystem and a GBAS Aircraft Subsystem.

GBAS Architecture

SBAS architecture

A SBAS is a safety critical system designed to augment one or several satellite navigation systems. The main components of a general GBAS architecture are:

• GBAS Ground Subsystem
• GBAS Aircraft Subsystem
• GNSS Satellites Subsystem

GBAS Ground Subsystem

The main purposes of the GBAS Ground Subsystem are: signals-in-space receive and decode, carrier smoothed code and differential corrections and integrity computation, integrity monitoring, generation and broadcasting of GBAS messages.

The GBAS Ground Subsystems consist of

• 2 to 4 GNSS Reference Receivers and their respective geographically separated antennas
• A VHF data broadcast (VDB) transmitter
• A monitor system
• Approach Database (FAS data)
• Ground processing functions

GBAS Aircraft Subsystem

The main element of GBAS Aircraft Subsystem is the aircraft GBAS Receivers.

The primary functions of the GBAS aircraft subsystem are:

• receive and decode the GNSS satellite and GBAS signals;
• determine the aircraft position;
• provide availability of the service;
• compute deviations from the desired flight path calculated from the Final Approach Segment (FAS) data;
• provide guidance signals and integrity information.

The GBAS aircraft subsystem essential elemenst are:

• An Aircraft GNSS Receiver Function that receives, tracks, and decodes the GNSS satellite signals.
• A VHF Data Broadcast Receiver Function that receives and decodes the messages broadcast by the GBAS Ground Subsystem.
• An Aircraft Navigation Processing Function that receives the measurement of the pseudo-ranges from the GNSS Receiver Function, applies the differential corrections received from the VHF Data Broadcast Receiver Function and calculates the differentially corrected aircraft position. The Aircraft Navigation Processing Function extracts from the different FAS path construction data received, the one having the Reference Path Selector selected by the crew through the GLS Channel Number Selector. The Aircraft Navigation Processing Function also calculates deviations from the selected FAS path based on its differentially corrected position.

GNSS Satellites Subsystem

The GBAS Satellites Subsystem is mainly the [[GNSS systems description |GNSS constellations] declared operational for civil use. The minimum requirements of a GBAS system are limited for the use of GNSS satellites ranging sources, with additional ranging sources being supplied by SBAS as an option.

GBAS Signal

The GBAS Signal in Space is defined to be only the data broadcast from the ground to the aircraft subsystem. The Satellite Signals in Space are part of the basic GNSS satellite constellations.

The GBAS ground subsystem differential computed corrections, (contained in Type 1 message), GBAS ground subsystem related data (contained in Type 2 message) and Final Approach Segments (FAS) (contained in Type 4 message) are transmitted to the aircraft users via VHF Data Broadcast (VDB) Signal. The GBAS Messages are encoded in this signal. The specification of GBAS messaged data format is contained in the .......... SBAS-> "The specification of the SBAS message data format is contained in the ICAO SARPS Appendix B for the aspects related with the signal in space, as well as in the RTCA MOPS DO-229D for the minimum performance requirements applicable to the airborne SBAS receiver equipment. The format of the messages is thoroughly explained in the article The EGNOS SBAS Message Format Explained."

GBAS Performances

The SBAS performances are defined with respect to the level of service that the system is designed to provide. The main source for SBAS performances comes from civil aviation navigation safety requirements and they are different for each civil aviation operation.ref="ICAO_SARPS"

Typical Operation	Horizontal Accuracy (95%)	Vertical Accuracy (95%)	Integrity	Time-To-Alert (TTA)	Continuity	Availability
En-route	3.7 km (2.0 NM)	N/A	1 – 1 × 10-7/h	5 min	1 – 1 × 10-4/h to 1 – 1 × 10-8/h	0.99 to 0.99999
En-route Terminal	0.74 km (0.4 NM)	N/A	1 – 1 × 10-7/h	15 s	1 – 1 × 10-4/h to 1 – 1 × 10-8/h	0.99 to 0.99999
Initial approach, Intermediate approach, Non-precision approach (NPA), Departure	220 m (720 ft)	N/A	1 –1x10-7/h	10 s	1 – 1x10-4/h to 1 – 1x10-8/h	0.99 to 0.99999
Approach operations with vertical guidance (APV-I)	16 m (52 ft)	20 m (66 ft)	1 – 2 × 10-7 per approach	10 s	1 – 8 × 10-6 in any 15 s	0.99 to 0.99999
Approach operations with vertical guidance (APV-II)	16 m (52 ft)	8 m (26 ft)	1 – 2 × 10-7 per approach	6 s	1 – 8 × 10-6 in any 15 s	0.99 to 0.99999
Category I precision Approach	16 m (52 ft)	6.0 m to 4.0 m (20 ft to 13 ft)	1 – 2 × 10-7 per approach	6 s	1 – 8 × 10-6 in any 15 s	0.99 to 0.99999

As indicated in the table above, the performance requirements are expressed in terms of four quantitative concepts, many of them to be interpreted as probabilistic figures:

• Accuracy: is expressed in terms of Navigation System Error (NSE) as the difference between the real position of the aircraft and the position provided by the airborne equipment. A SBAS assures the compliance with respect the accuracy requirements by providing to the user corrections to the satellite orbit and clock errors as well as to the ionospheric residual propagation error.
• Integrity: is defined by ICAO as a measure of the trust that can be placed in the correctness of the information supplied by the system. This general statement is expressed at the SBAS system level as the maximum allowable probability that the navigation position error exceeds alarm limit and the navigation system does not alert the pilot in a time less than the time to alert. The SBAS assures the integrity requirements by:
  • Providing to the user satellite and/or ionospheric alarms in order to inform the user to reject the corresponding satellite/ionospheric corrections in its positioning computation.
  • Providing to the user Horizontal and Vertical Protection Level information (HPL, VPL) in order to assess the availability of the system, by comparing these PLs with the corresponding Alarm Limits (AL) for a given phase of flight (see next tabel). The SBAS computes and broadcasts integrity bounds to the satellite orbit and clock (UDRE) corrections as well as to the ionospheric corrections errors (GIVE) so that the user is able to compute a PL that over bounds the navigation system error experienced by the user with the integrity risk requirement.

Operation	Horizontal AL	Vertical AL
En-route (oceanic/continental)	7.4 Km (4 NM)	N/A
En-route (continental)	3.7 Km (2 NM)	N/A
En-route, Terminal	1.85 Km (1 NM)	N/A
NPA	556 m (0.3 NM)	N/A
APV-I	40 m (130 ft)	50 m (164 ft)
LPV200	40 m (130 ft)	35 m (200 ft)
APV-II	40 m (130 ft)	20 m (66 ft)
Category I	40 m (130 ft)	15 to 10 m (50 ft to 33 ft)

• Continuity: is the probability that the specified system performance will be maintained for the duration of a phase of operation, presuming that the system was available at the beginning of that phase of operation and was predicted to operate throughout the operation. Lack of continuity means that the operation must be aborted (with the associated risk).
• Availability: is the probability that the navigation service is available at the beginning of the planned operation. A SBAS is considered available when the accuracy, integrity and continuity requirements are met and it is measured in terms of probability of the system being available for any given user at any given time. In practice, the availability is computed by measuring the probability of a protrection level being below its corresponding alarm limit. It should be noted that a lack of availability is not a safety concern but prevents the nominal operation of the system, and implies an associated impact on the service operation status.